On Dialetheic Entailment by Carrara, Massimiliano et al.
 The Logica Yearbook 
2011 

  
 
 
The Logica Yearbook 
2011 
 
 
 
Edited by 
Michal Peli! 
and 
Vít Pun"ochá# 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Individual author and College Publications 2012. 
All rights reserved. 
 
ISBN 978-1-84890-071-4 
 
College Publications 
Scientific Director: Dov Gabbay 
Managing Director: Jane Spurr 
Department of Computer Science 
King’s College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK 
 
www.collegepublications.co.uk 
 
Original cover design by Laraine Welch 
Printed by Lightning Source, Milton Keynes, UK 
 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise 
without prior permission, in writing, from the publisher. 
Preface
Since 1997 participants in the Logica symposia have had the opportu-
nity of publishing their contributions in The Logica Yearbook series.
Last year was no exception and so we have the pleasure of introduc-
ing the latest volume of the proceedings which contains most of the
papers presented at Logica 2011.
The international symposium Logica has a long and rich tradition
and, in this respect, last year was very special because we were cele-
brating an important anniversary. Logica 2011 was the 25th event in
the series of conferences annually held in the Czech Republic.
Logica 2011, held at Hejnice Monastery (North Bohemia) from
20th to 24th June 2011, was organized by the Department of Logic in
the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech
Republic. As every year, the symposium brought together logicians
from the whole world and besides the invited talks (invited speakers
were Edwin Mares, Pavel Materna, Krister Segerberg and Gila Sher)
about thirty other papers devoted to the various branches of logic
were presented.
Both the Logica symposium and The Logica Yearbook are the
result of the joint effort of many people who deserve our warmest
thanks. We thank Vladimír Svoboda, the head of the Organizing
Committee of Logica 2011. We are very grateful to the Institute of
Philosophy and especially its director, Pavel Baran, for all their sup-
port. We would like to thank College Publications and its managing
director Jane Spurr. We greatly appreciate the hard work of Karel
Chvalovský, the typesetter of this volume. Special thanks go to Petra
Ivaničová who provided invaluable assistance to the organizers of the
conference.
We are also very grateful to the staff of Hejnice Monastery and to
Bernard Family Brewery of Humpolec which has traditionally spon-
sored the social programme of the symposium. Neither the publication
of this volume, nor the conference Logica 2011 itself would be possi-
ble without the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic which provided
significant support by financing the grant project no. 401/04/0117.
Last, but not least, we would like to thank all the authors for their
exemplary collaboration during the editorial process.
Prague, May 2012 Michal Peliš and Vít Punčochář
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On Dialetheic Entailment
Massimiliano Carrara Enrico Martino
Vittorio Morato
Abstract
The entailment connective is introduced by Priest (2006b). It
aims to capture, in a dialetheically acceptable way, the infor-
mal notion of logical consequence. This connective does not
“fall foul” of Curry’s Paradox by invalidating an inference rule
called “Absorption” (or “Contraction”) and the classical logical
theorem called “Assertion”. In this paper we show that the
semantics of entailment, given by Priest in terms of possible
worlds, is inadequate. In particular, we will argue that Priest’s
counterexamples to Absorption and Assertion use in the meta-
language a dialetheically unacceptable principle. Furthermore,
we show that the rejection of Assertion undermines Priest’s
claim that the entailment connective expresses the notion of
logical consequence.
Keywords: dialetheism, entailment, possible world semantics,
Curry’s paradox
1 Introduction
In In contradiction (2006b), G. Priest has introduced a new connective
aimed to capture, in a dialetheically acceptable way, the informal
notion of entailment or logical consequence.
According to Priest, any dialetheically acceptable connective for
entailment must, at least, have the following two features:
• it must validate MPP;
• it must not “fall foul” of Curry’s Paradox.
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An entailment connective must obey MPP because, according to
Priest, it is the very meaning of the word “entailment” or “implication”
to require it. It is then analytically true of any kind of genuine con-
ditional that it should satisfy such a rule. “Any conditional worth its
salt should satisfy the modus ponens principle”, Priest writes. Accord-
ing to Priest, the classical material conditional → (or any conditional
built on its basis, such as the strict implication, for example) cannot
be used to capture the informal notion of entailment, at least in a
dialetheic logical context. Priest holds that the material conditional
is not genuine. In the logical framework of Priest (1979), where the
material conditional was used, MPP was labelled a quasi-valid rule, a
rule that is valid provided that all truth-values involved are classical
(i.e., solely true or solely false).
An entailment connective must not “fall foul” of Curry’s Paradox,
because from Curry’s Paradox follows trivialism, i.e., the thesis that
every formula is true, and trivialism is to be avoided by the dialetheist.
Curry’s paradox can be proved using self-reference devices, T-
schemas, MPP, conditional proof and an inference rule called “ab-
sorption” or “contraction”:
ABS
φ→ (φ→ ψ)
φ→ ψ
A dialetheic logic with entailment can avoid Curry’s paradox, and thus
trivialism, by invalidating ABS. This is in fact the strategy chosen by
Priest.
It is to be noted, however, that there are other, quite standard,
formulations of Curry’s paradox that do not rely explicitly (i.e., at the
level of the object language) on ABS. In some formulations, they rely
on another related principle called “assertion” or even “pseudo modus
ponens”:
(Assertion) φ ∧ (φ→ ψ)→ ψ
As we will see, formulations of Curry’s paradox with (Assertion) are
blocked in Priest’s approach in the same way in which formulations
with ABS are blocked.
Formulations of Curry’s paradox that do not rely on ABS at the
level of the object language, however, typically make an appeal to
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such a rule at the level of the meta-language; in such cases, ABS is a
structural rule governing the consequence relation.1
In Carrara, Gaio, and Martino (2010), criticisms to the entailment
connective were done in the larger framework of criticizing the various
attempts made by Priest to avoid trivialism generated by Curry’s
Paradox.
This article is a sequel of that work and will be squarely devoted
to dialetheic entailment and its problems.
We are going to show that there is a tension between the logical
rules used in the object language and those used in the meta-language.
2 The semantics of entailment
The characteristic feature of the entailment connective, that we will
indicate from now on with the symbol ⇒, is that of being a modal
connective: its truth-conditions are in fact given in terms of a quan-
tification over a set of possible worlds. Having a modal force is what
distinguishes ⇒ from the material conditional of classical logic. The
modal force of ⇒, however, is quite different from the force of other
well-known modal conditionals, such as the strict conditional, or even
the counterfactual conditional. Both conditionals, in fact, validate
ABS and (Assertion).
An interpretation I for a language L with⇒ is given by a quadru-
ple 〈W,R,G, v〉, where W is, as usual, an arbitrary set of objects
(“possible worlds”), R is a dyadic relation between members of W
(“the accessibility relation”), G is a designated member of W (“the
actual world”) and v a valuation function that assigns to each propo-
sitional atom and world w a non-empty subset of {0, 1}, where 1 is
the value “true”, 0 is the value “false”.
The semantic clauses that define the truth-conditions for a formula
like φ⇒ ψ are the following:
φ⇒ ψ is true in w if, and only if, for every world w′ such that
R(w,w′), if 1 ∈ vw′(φ), then 1 ∈ vw′(ψ) and if 0 ∈ vw′(ψ), then
0 ∈ vw′(φ)
φ⇒ ψ is then true in a world w if and only if, for every world w′
accessible from w, if φ is true in w′, so is ψ and if ψ is false in w′, so
1Cfr. Beall and Murzi (in press).
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is φ. From the clause above, it follows that a formula like φ⇒ ψ is
false at a world w if and only if there is at least one accessible world
w′ such that in w′ φ is solely true and ψ is false or φ is true and ψ is
solely false.
The definitions, respectively, of semantic consequence and logical
truth are the following:
(SC) Γ |= α if and only if for all I, if, for every β ∈ Γ, 1 ∈ vG(β),
then 1 ∈ vG(α)
(LC) |= α if and only if, for every I, 1 ∈ vG(α).
Note that the definitions of logical truth as truth in each actual world
of every interpretation and of logical consequence as truth preservation
in every actual world of every interpretation are in accordance with
the standard Kripkean definitions of logical truth and of semantic
consequence.
Counterexamples to ABS are obtained, as we will see, by means of
interpretations with the following two features:
• G is omniscient : for every w ∈W , R(G,w)
• R is non-reflexive: there is at least one w ∈ W such that
¬R(w,w)
The omniscience of G means that G “sees” all other possible worlds;
this implies that, for G, it holds that R(G,G).
These kind of interpretations invalidate ABS. To prove that ABS
is not a valid inference rule we must show that φ⇒ψ is not a semantic
consequence of φ⇒ (φ⇒ψ). To do this, we have to show that there is
at least one interpretation I such that φ⇒(φ⇒ψ) is true at the actual
world, while φ⇒ ψ is false. Consider the following interpretation:
• W = {G,w}
• R(G,w), ¬R(w,w), R(G,G), R(w,G)
• vG(φ) = vG(ψ) = vw(φ) = {1}, vw(ψ) = {0}
In such an interpretation, vG(φ⇒ (φ⇒ ψ)) = {1}: since φ and ψ are
true at G, the unique world accessible from w, φ⇒ψ is true in w. So
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in every world accessible from G, namely G and w, if φ is true, then
φ⇒ ψ is true.
In such an interpretation, however, vG(φ ⇒ ψ) = {0}, because
there exists at least one world accessible from G (namely, w) where
φ is true and ψ is false. Note that the use of = instead of ∈ for the
evaluation function v signals that in such interpretation no dialetheia
is involved. Counterexamples to ABS then have nothing to do with
dialetheiae.
The very same interpretation can be used to show that (Assertion)
is not valid. (Assertion) is invalid if, in some actual world, φ ∧ (φ⇒
ψ)⇒ ψ is false in it. In the interpretation presented above, vG(φ ∧
(φ⇒ ψ)⇒ ψ) = {0}, because there is at least one world accessible
from G, namely w, where vw(φ ∧ (φ⇒ ψ)) = {1} and vw(ψ) = {0}.
The non-reflexivity of R and the omniscience of the actual worlds
are essential for Priest’s purposes. On the one hand, as we have just
seen, if the R of the interpretations for ⇒ were reflexive, ABS and
(Assertion) would be valid. If, on the other hand, some Gs were not
reflexive, then MPP would fail for ⇒. Remind that failure of MPP
for ⇒ means that there is some actual world where φ and φ⇒ ψ are
true and ψ is false. Consider the following interpretation:
• W = {G,w}
• ¬R(G,G), R(G,w), R(w,G), R(w,w)
• vG(φ) = vw(φ) = vw(ψ) = {1}, vG(ψ) = {0}
In this interpretation ψ is false in G, but φ and φ⇒ ψ are true in
G; in particular, φ⇒ ψ is true in G because it is true in every world
accessible to G, namely w.
The failure of (Assertion) shows that Priest’s entailment fails to
express logical consequence: while ψ is a semantic consequence of
φ ∧ (φ⇒ ψ), this conjunction does not entail ψ.
The countermodels to ABS might be used to reveal other interest-
ing characteristics of the language containing ⇒ and, in particular,
its interactions with the necessity operator !.
The fact that there is a non necessary formula where⇒ is the main
connective, means that there is some formula that “logically follows”
from another formula, but such that does not necessarily follows from
it. This separation of logical necessity from logical consequence might
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be taken as undesirable: it is quite strange that α logically follows
from β, but only contingently.
The contingency of entailment has consequences at the level of
rules. As we already know, MPP is a valid rule in the logic of ⇒.
That MPP is a valid rule means that ψ is a semantic consequence
of φ and φ⇒ ψ and this means that in every actual world of every
interpretation if 1 ∈ vG(φ) and 1 ∈ vG(φ⇒ ψ), then 1 ∈ vG(ψ). As
our countermodel to ABS reveals, however, MPP “fails” in w, where
1 ∈ vw(φ) and 1 ∈ vw(φ⇒ ψ) but 1 /∈ vw(ψ).
“Failure” of MPP in at least one non-actual world could be in-
terpreted in two ways: on the one hand—and this would be per-
fectly compatible with the spirit of dialetheism—it could be taken as
showing that non-actual possible worlds are deviant worlds; on the
other hand—and we think that this is more problematic, even for the
dialetheist—that we, from the standpoint of the actual world, are not
able to reason about those worlds with our standard logical rules.
3 The philosophical justification of non-reflexivity
and omniscience
What Priest aims to do in In contradiction is to give also a philo-
sophical justification of omniscience and non-reflexivity. His views
are revealed by this passage:
Now, how do we know that all the “possible worlds” in
an interpretation are conceivable by people living under
those conditions of G? Simply because we are those peo-
ple (by definition), and we conceive them. It is we who
are theorizing, specifying what interpretations are, and we
who can spell out any particular [assignment]. If we were
to live under a different set of conditions, however, there
would be no guarantee that we would be able to think
all of this. Indeed, had we not evolved, we might have
been maladapted to our environment, and might not even,
therefore, have been able to conceive properly of the condi-
tions under which we actually lived. G is omniscient, but
there is no reason, therefore, why any other world should
be omniscient or even reflexive. (Priest, 2006b, p. 87)
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From this quoted passage we can extract the main motivations Priest
uses to philosophically justify omniscience and non-reflexivity:
Omniscience of G: G is omniscient because the totality of pos-
sible worlds accessible from the actual world of an interpretation
is the totality of the possible worlds conceivable by the inhabi-
tants of G.
As we have seen, from the omniscience of G follows the reflexivity of
G that Priest justifies in this way:
Reflexivity of G: G is accessible from itself because the inhabi-
tants of G are “adapted” to their actual conditions and therefore
they are able to conceive/represent them.
Finally, there is the non-reflexivity of some non-actual worlds from
which it naturally follows their non-omniscience (if a non-actual world
were omniscient, it would be accessible from itself).
Non-reflexivity and non-omniscience of non-actual worlds:
We cannot grant inhabitants of other possible worlds the ability
to conceive all possible worlds and even the ability to conceive
their own situation.
There are various aspects of this philosophical picture that are prob-
lematic. We are going to mention just a few of them.
Against Omniscience, for example, it could be argued that it is
generally assumed, in contemporary debates about the relations about
conceivability and metaphysical possibility, that conceivability/possi-
bility links fails in both directions;2 it cannot then be assumed, or at
least it cannot be assumed without argument, that a world is possi-
ble if and only if it is conceivable. We might not be able to conceive
metaphysically or logically possible worlds that are accessible and thus
relevant for the evaluation of sentences containing the entailment con-
nective.
Furthermore, if omniscience of G is explained, as Priest does, via
conceivability, there seems to be a clash between omniscience and non-
reflexivity. Conceivability-based accounts of omniscience in fact seems
to presuppose unrestricted reflexivity. Something is conceivable if it
2Cf. Gendler and Hawthorne (2002).
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is conceived by us in an alternative (epistemic) situation. But to con-
ceive something in an alternative situation we need to have access to
this alternative situation. To know that we are conceiving something
in another possible world (and therefore to know that something is
conceivable by us in the actual world) we need to have access to the
world in which we are conceiving. It could be denied that the reflex-
ivity of a world has to be understood in terms of the capacity of its
inhabitants to access this world; the quotation above reveals, however,
that this is exactly what Priest had in mind.
Against non-reflexivity it could be argued that it does not fit well
with the very nature of modal reasoning. The point of modal reason-
ing is that of reasoning in the actual situation about counterfactual
situations. Without reflexivity, from knowing that φ is true in an ac-
cessible world w, we cannot even conclude that φ is possible in w (in
non-reflexive frames, is false).
Another problem of non-reflexivity is revealed in the interpreta-
tions used to falsify ABS. In those interpretations, the evaluation of
φ⇒ ψ in w is done disregarding the truth-values of φ and ψ in w.
For such an entailment to be true in w, what is relevant are just the
truth-values of φ and ψ in G. This makes the evaluation of formulas
containing ⇒ quite different from the evaluation of formulas contain-
ing the other connectives.
But it is quite strange that the truth-values of φ and ψ are acces-
sible when evaluating, for example, a conjunction in w, while they are
not accessible when evaluating an entailment in w. What could be the
interest of knowing the truth-value of φ⇒ ψ in w if the truth-values
of φ and ψ in w are just irrelevant to evaluate φ⇒ ψ in w?
It seems therefore difficult to find an independent motivation for
Omniscience and Non-reflexivity for the interpretation of ⇒. These
features seems to be specifically designed just to avoid ABS and there-
fore Curry’s paradox.
In the next section we will show that, even from a logical point of
view, the counterexamples to ABS are problematic.
4 Rejection and entailment
In Doubt Truth to be a Liar (2006a), Priest introduces the notion
of rejection. The rejection of a certain proposition φ, according to
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Priest, is a cognitive state consisting in the refusal of believing φ.
To refuse to believe φ is having positive reasons to keep φ out of
one’s own belief box. The linguistic expression of rejection is denial.
According to Priest, in most contexts, the assertion of a formula like
φ⇒ ⊥ constitutes the act of denial of φ.3 In “normal conditions”,
writes Priest (2006a, p. 105), the rejection of φ could be expressed by
the denial of φ, namely φ⇒⊥.
What Priest intends by “most contexts” and “normal conditions”
is explained by the following quotation:
In most contexts, an assertion of [. . . ] α⇒⊥ would consti-
tute an act of denial. Assuming that the person is normal,
they will reject ⊥, and so, by implication, α. The quali-
fier “in most contexts” is there because if one were ever to
come across a trivialist who accepts ⊥, this would not be
the case. For such a person an assertion of [α⇒⊥] would
not constitute a denial: nothing would. (Priest, 2006a,
pp. 105–106)
From this it follows that the dialetheist is “normal”, since he is not
a trivialist; then he must accept that the rejection of φ could be
expressed by φ⇒⊥.
Now consider the Curry’s sentence relative to ⊥:
(Curry) φ⇔ (φ⇒⊥)
If φ were true (possibly a dialetheia) then also (φ⇒⊥) would be true,
due to the equivalence between the two; but then, by MPP, it would
be possible to derive ⊥. The dialetheist is thus forced, on pain of
trivialism, to reject φ. If φ is rejected, however, also (φ⇒⊥) should
be rejected. But then (φ⇒⊥) cannot be used to express the rejection
of φ: in order to express the rejection of φ, (φ⇒⊥) must be true.
Furthermore, given that the rejection of φ implies the rejection of
(φ⇒⊥), we must deny that (φ⇒⊥) is true, in spite of the falsity of
the antecedent φ. In terms of the possible world semantics given for
entailment, the falsity of (φ⇒⊥) implies the existence of a possible
world w, accessible from the actual, where φ is true and ⊥ is false.
3⊥ is a logical constant (falsum) such that it is a logical truth that ⊥ ⇒ α,
(for every α). ⊥ is basically the symbol for an explosive sentence (i.e., a sentence
implying all the others). ⊥ must be solely false for the dialetheist, because if it
were true, trivialism would follow.
46 Massimiliano Carrara, Enrico Martino, and Vittorio Morato
Given that (Curry) is true in G, (φ⇒ ⊥) is true in w; but, for
this entailment to be true in w, in every world w′, accessible from
w, it must happen that if φ is true, then ⊥ is true. To define an
interpretation where all these conditions obtain, we need to assign to
φ the value 0 in every w′ accessible to w; this in order to conclude that
if φ is true then ⊥ is true. But in order to justify this metalinguistic
conclusion we need to accept, in the metalanguage, the derived rule
of False Antecedent. It is only on the basis of the mere falsity of the
antecedent “φ is true” that we can conclude that our metalinguistic
statement is true.
The dialetheic justification for rejecting False Antecedent is that it
would immediatly lead to trivialism. Assume that α is a dialetheia and
consider an arbitrary formula β, or better ⊥. In such a case α would
be true (because a dialetheia is also true), but by False Antecedent
also α⇒⊥ would be true (because α is also false), but from this, by
MPP, ⊥ would be true and trivialism would follow.
In the case of (Curry), however, the dialetheist could defend the
legitimacy of using False Antecedent for the metalinguistic proposition
“if φ is true, then ⊥ is true” because φ is not a dialetheia. But as we
have seen above, Priest’s solution to Curry’s Paradox requires that,
in the object language, φ⇒⊥ be false in G even if φ is solely false.
We have therefore a case where the sole falsity of an antecedent fails
to guarantee the truth of the corresponding conditional. The falsity
of φ⇒⊥ is justified by Priest by the existence of a world accessible
from the actual where φ is true and ⊥ is false. But as we have seen
above, in order to justify this, the rule of False Antecedent needs to
be used in the metalanguage.
In the next section, we will argue that the use of False Antecedent
in the metalanguage and the failure of False Antecedent in the object
language conflicts with one of the main tenets of dialetheism, namely
that the principles used in the metalanguage should be dialetheically
acceptable.
5 Concluding remarks
Unlike the dialetheic solution to the Liar Paradox, Priest’s solution
to Curry’s Paradox does not make use of dialetheias. The paradox is
solved by postulating a genuine conditional, the entailment connec-
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tive, that invalidates ABS, (Assertion) and solves Curry’s Paradox.
The entailment connective is a modal one and its semantic is given
in terms of possible worlds.
As we have already observed, failure of (Assertion) is in conflict
with Priest’s requirement that the entailment connective expresses
the informal notion of logical consequence. This failure is essential to
avoiding the paradox: trivialism is in fact a semantic consequence of
(Curry) and (Assertion). For assume φ⇔(φ⇒⊥) and φ∧(φ⇒⊥)⇒⊥
are true in G. Since φ⇒⊥ is false in G, for the truth-conditions of
entailment, there exists a possible, non trivial, world w where φ is
true and ⊥ is solely false. But in this world, the truth of φ implies the
truth of φ⇒⊥ (by (Curry)) and thus the truth of their conjunction
φ ∧ (φ⇒ ⊥), which is the antecedent of (Assertion). Therefore, ⊥
must be true in w.
Counterexamples to ABS and Curry’s Paradox, given in terms
of such semantics, presuppose that a rule like False Antecedent be
false for the entailment used in the object language, but true for the
conditional used in the meta-language.
What kind of conditional is then used in the meta-language?
A dialetheically acceptable metalinguistic conditional, for which
False Antecedent is correct, is the material conditional. But this, as
we know, is not a genuine conditional (it invalidates MPP) and its
use in the metalanguage would invalidate MPP also for⇒, on pain of
trivialism, as the following interpretation shows:
• W = {G,w}
• no constraint on R
• {0, 1} = vG(φ), 0 ∈ vw(φ)
According to this interpretation, φ and φ⇒⊥ are true in G, because
in every world accessible to G, the meta-linguistic conditional “if φ is
true, then ⊥ is true” is true. Indeed, this proposition amounts to the
disjunction “φ is false or ⊥ is true”, that is true in every world because
φ is false; but then, by MPP, we obtain, in the object language, ⊥.
On the other hand, if the metalinguistic conditional is a genuine
conditional, it seems that, according to Priest, it should not satisfy
False Antecedent. Thus it remains highly problematic for the dialethe-
ist how to interpret the conditional used in the meta-language.
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